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Abstract 
‘Nature’/’Nurture’ controversies have been perennial in the study of language, one of 
the oldest subjects of intellectual endeavor. The first half of this century saw us at the Nurture 
pole of the oscillation, the second half has placed us at the Nature pole. It would be desirable 
to escape this pendulum. 
The main current approach to ‘naturalizing’ language is what I shall call ‘Simple 
Nativism’. It holds that both in form (syntax) and content (semantics) language is essentially 
innate. Syntax is governed by an innate ‘Universal Grammar’, and the ideas encoded are just 
elements of  the ‘Language of Thought’. The problem with this approach is that it minimizes 
the very substantial differences between languages in both form and content. An alternative 
strategy for naturalizing language is coevolutionary theory, which conceives of culture as a 
self-replicating track of information parallel to, and interacting with, the genome, but with 
faster rates of adaptation and change. On this view, language is  a hybrid biological/cultural 
phenomenon, and the human language ability has a built-in expectation of  variation.  
In the body of the paper, I focus on the issue of whether the content  of linguistic 
categories is a direct projection from an innate ‘Language of Thought’.  I review three 
conceptual domains (color, kinship and space) often claimed to be the locus of semantic 
universals and argue that the substantial variations across languages fits a coevolutionary 
perspective much better than a Simple Nativist one. Linguistic categories evolve to solve local 
adaptive problems, and they strongly influence the conceptual categories in which people 
think. I conclude that a coevolutionary perspective, by attempting to ‘naturalize Nurture’, 
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offers a prospect for escaping the perennial oscillations between radical nativism and radical 




The perennial pendulum 
Observations and theories about the nature of language constitute one of the oldest 
forms of intellectual inquiry. The preoccupation is not hard to understand: language and 
human nature seem inextricably intertwined, and the gulf between our own species and other 
animals – whether it is conceived of as the possession of  high intelligence, consciousness or 
culture  – seems intimately connected to the possession of language. The lack of continuity 
with other species, together with our own cultural diversity, has invited us over the millennia 
to think of ourselves as outside nature, as quintessentially products of culture. But there has 
always been a perennial view of another kind: that we are cultural and linguistic beasts by 
virtue of  human nature. On the first view what is emphasized is the variety of  languages, on 
the second what is emphasized is the deep, hidden commonalities between languages. Eight 
hundred years ago, scholarship already lurched between the poles of  linguistic relativism and 
universal grammar.1 Indeed, over two and half millennia of  the Western intellectual tradition 
views have oscillated between viewing language as part of  human nature, or alternatively, 
seeing language as essentially part of human culture. Although the twentieth century has seen 
a veritable explosion of knowledge and theory in the language sciences, this particular 
ideological issue continues to dog us. We still have not found a satisfactory way to bridge the 
tired old Nature:Nurture issues.2 As the authors of a recent book on the subject put it: “The 
answer is not Nature or Nurture, but Nature and Nurture. But to say that is to trade one 
platitude for another; what is necessary is to understand the nature of that interaction” (Elman 
et al., 1996:357). The current swing of the pendulum has the language sciences out on a 
Nature pole, with language often treated as an ‘instinct’ (Pinker, 1994, Gopnik, 1997; but see 
Tomasello, 1995). But what I want to suggest in this paper is that to transcend the oscillations 
of the pendulum we need to find a new framework that will focus our inquiry on the peculiar 
kind of interaction in language between biology and culture.  
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2.0 Strategies for naturalizing language 
 
The last half of this century has been much preoccupied with naturalizing language. 
By this I mean, trying to find a place in  nature for what a long tradition has often assumed is 
indisputably a part of culture. Like most practicing linguists, I am generally sympathetic to 
the strategy. We are awed by the complexity of language, and the ease with which children 
learn it. We are also impressed by the neurophysiological adaptations that make language 
possible. But the particular ‘naturalizing’ strategy generally adopted in the language sciences 
has taken a peculiar turn with which I want to quarrel.  
 
‘Simple Nativism’ vs. ‘Coevolutionism’: or why there is more than one language 
The particular strategy for naturalizing language now dominant amongst linguists and 
psychologists holds that language is a mere projection of universal internal mental structures. 
I will dub the view ‘Simple Nativism’. On this view, natural selection – or even perhaps an 
evolutionary accident - has delivered to our species two fundamental kinds of  mental 
endowment which are directly reflected in language. The one is architectural and is 
constituted by universals of syntax, which are constraints on possible rule systems. The view 
that this system (‘Universal Grammar’)  is innate  is of course associated with Chomsky. The 
other relevant endowment, on this view,  is a structure of mental content: a rich set of innate 
concepts, given by some uniform central ‘language of thought’, together with specialized 
mental faculties that input to it, as in the influential views of Fodor (1975, 1983) - or 
alternatively, as given solely by a prestructuring of specific domains of human problem-
solving, as in the views of the ‘evolutionary psychologists’ (see Barkow et al., 1992).  
‘Simple Nativism’ might seem inevitably to presuppose an evolutionary perspective. 
But Chomsky for one decisively rejects the idea that our innate linguistic abilities have 
evolved as adaptive features.3 He thinks he has discerned deep, underlying, quirky constraints 
which limit the class of possible human grammars and which are in many respects anti-
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adaptive – e.g. they make the parsing of  sentences difficult. Dennett (1995:487) puts his 
finger on the issue: 
 The very considerations that in other parts of the biosphere count for an explanation 
in terms of natural selection of an adaptation – manifest utility, obvious value, 
undeniable reasonableness of design - count against  the need for any such 
explanation in the case of human behavior. If a trick is that good it will be routinely 
rediscovered by every culture. 
So we have a kind of reversal of  the general line of argumentation: in the human field, 
adaptive strategies need no genetic underpinning, only non-adaptive ones do! Hence 
Chomsky’s interest in the quirky details of syntax and the belief that it is these non-adaptive 
patterns which establish the innate nature of  language in his very special sense of ‘Universal 
Grammar’. In fact, there is no real incompatibility between the common-sense view that 
language in a broad sense has evolved as a highly adaptive communication system and 
Chomsky’s view that the quirky details of syntax are accidental – the latter may well be side-
effects of the evolution of  language as a communication system. For this reason, Simple 
Nativism seems quite compatible with an evolutionary perspective (Pinker and Bloom, 1990).  
However, this entire strategy for naturalizing language seems to me to be wrong, at 
least in emphasis. For it entails ignoring or minimizing the very substantial differences 
between languages and cultures.4 Culture itself is an evolved system that allows rapid 
adaptation to varying conditions and which has made it possible for us to invade almost every 
ecological niche on the planet. The right strategy for naturalizing language, I will argue, is 
therefore not to ignore those linguistic and cultural differences, but to embrace them.  We are 
built to handle the diversity: language is a bio-cultural hybrid. The way to naturalize this 
duality of traditions, genetic and cultural, is through the theory of coevolution. Coevolution 
can be studied in symbiotic relations between species. But the idea of  the mutual adaptation 
of two gene lines can be extended (perhaps somewhat metaphorically) to the idea of the 
mutual adaptation of  a gene line and a line of cultural transmission.5 The concept of 
genetic/cultural coevolution is now familiar through the work of Dawkins, 1976; Cavalli-
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Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Lumsden and Wilson, 1981;  Durham, 
1991; Laland et al., 1995, and others. Theories here vary across a spectrum from 
sociobiological reductionism to mild interactionism – in what follows I shall presume a model 
of the mild interactionist type (as in Durham, 1991) in which culture has a life of its own, but 
nevertheless is supported by and interacts with our biology. There is evidence for adaptation 
of the human gene pool to such cultural practices as dairy farming, swidden agriculture 
(increased malarial ecologies being compensated for by malarial resistance), female 
infanticide, and so forth. But the very best and most obvious exemplar is language, which for 
inexplicable reasons has so far played little role in coevolutionary models (but cf. Deacon, 
1997). We cannot run like a horse because we have a vocal tract in the way; we are the only 
mammal that cannot eat and breathe at the same time, because our larynx is lowered in order 
to maximize the length of the  vocal tract; we have hearing specialized to the frequencies of 
human speech; we have brain areas and neural pathways dedicated to speech processing (see 
Lieberman, 1984). And all this hardware is there because the cultural traditions of languages 
are there; and the cultural traditions are there, because the hardware enables them.  
Without this theory of twin-track evolution, it would be hard indeed to understand 
why there is not just one language. Pinker and Bloom (1990:716), Simple Nativists by 
inclination, consider this conundrum as it pertains to word meaning. They admit to no firm 
answers, but add that it is just more practical for “the genome to store the vocabulary in the 
environment”. But for the ‘environment to store the information’, it has to be a self-
reproducing system of its own. That is the whole point of the co-evolutionary perspective: 
culture creates and maintains just the environment that will exploit the possibilities in the 
genome, which in turn enable the culture. Because the genome has, as it were, yielded over 
the business of fast adaptation to another self-replicating line, we inevitably end up with one 
species with many languages.  
Much more needs to be said about both coevolutionary theory in general, and its 
application to language in particular, but that would be another paper and indeed another 
author. Suffice it to say that, as Dobzhansky (1962:18) said 40 years ago, there is a feedback 
 6
relation between culture and biology and that we have some worked-out ideas about how to 
account for the apparent Lamarkian effects of culture on genome – through such mechanisms 
as sexual selection, the Baldwin effect and (most controversially) group selection. Contrary to 
some Simple Nativists (e.g., Tooby and Cosmides, 1992) there is nothing mystical in these 
sorts of processes, whereby, for example, cultural adaptations like warm clothing and harpoon 
technology make possible the colonization of the Arctic circle, whereupon  natural selection 
in turn engenders physiological adaptations to cold (such as stock body form, or 
vasodilatation in the limbs).  Moreover these processes give us some glimpse of the origin of 
language in the tension between cultural and genetic tracks, where ever more complex 
behavioral demands put a premium on cognitive capacities, whose development in turn made 
possible higher orders of cultural form in an accelerating spiral of cognitive and cultural 
complexity.  
Simple Nativists, if they are aware of this line of argument at all, are unaccountably 
hostile to it: they claim that all the regularities have long been fixed in the human mind, and 
that ideas about interactions at the biology/culture interface are as vague as the cultural 
relativism which is their main target.6 They take as their bottom line the fact that languages 
just seem too complex for children to learn – neither the smartest apes nor the smartest 
machines can do it. If language is essentially coded in the genes, then it seems that the 
apparent diversity must be mere surface camouflage on invariant substrate. But this argument 
carries little weight with coevolutionists: the complexity can be divided between innate 
learning biases on the one hand and patterns stored  in the cultural environment on the other – 
patterns that have precisely evolved to fit the learning biases. For a language to be viable as a 
cultural tradition, it has to be designed to latch on to innate learning biases.  
Unfortunately, it is doubtful that the development of a sophisticated co-evolutionary 
theory of language is likely to carry much weight with Simple Nativists. What may have 
more effect is to collect examples of the kinds of phenomenon which seem more tractable to a 
co-evolutionary view than to a Simple Nativist one, and that is the strategy I shall follow 
here.  
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 A telling example: infants are built to ‘tune in’ to specific languages  
Let me provide an immediate example of the way in which we seem built to handle 
linguistic diversity.  Infants, long before they learn language, are highly sensitive to the 
speech sounds around them. There seem to be a number of initial innate biases. Acoustic 
continua are categorically perceived, so that e.g. a continuous series of sounds between /i/ and 
/e/ and /å/  is partitioned into just three kinds of sound. There thus seems to be a kind of  
innate category grid. But something dramatic happens to this initial state within the first six 
months of  an infant’s exposure to the sounds of a particular language: the acoustic space 
becomes systematically and ineradicably distorted -  sounds that are acoustically equidistant 
will now become assigned to same or different categories along language-specific lines (Kuhl 
and Meltzoff, 1996; 1997).  
The end result is, as we all know, the set of spectacular biases in our auditory 
perception which make adults unable even to hear the difference between sounds that are 
fundamentally distinct in some other language. Thus the initial, innate categorical perception 
system ends up systematically skewed. Exposure to a specific language rebuilds our 
perceptual acuities, and it does so at such an early age that it seems inescapable that the 
system is built for variation, i.e., built for “tuning in” to the local system, whatever it turns out 
to be. But the character of that cultural tradition in turn is bound to be organized around a 
selection from the initial innate category grid – because cultural transmission and learning 
will always be biased by prototype sounds.  
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
 
We are in the unusual position, thanks to the work of Kuhl, that we know that 
monkeys also subject acoustic continua to the same sort of categorical perception. But they do 
not have the ability to warp the perceptual space in accord with the dominant speech sounds – 
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indeed there is very little evidence of  any learning from the acoustic character of  others 
monkeys’ calls (Kuhl, 1991; Kuhl and Meltzoff, 1997; Hauser, 1997:324).  
Now a Simple Nativist perspective might well predict the initial perceptual biases 
here, but it would be hard put to explain the specifically human characteristic – namely the 
restructuring of acoustic space to suit the local language in the first months after birth. Here a 
co-evolution perspective makes a lot more sense: since cultural traditions change at a much 
faster rate than the genome, the system is built to handle diversity. In fact we know a great 
deal about the rapidity of  sound changes in language (e.g., in New York,  /E/ went through 
/e/ to /i/ in words like bad in just 65 years; Labov, 1994:74-5), and we also know that sharing 
accents is a crucial marker of group membership, which deeply effects the life chances of 
individuals. 
 
3.0 The content of linguistic categories 
 
As mentioned earlier, Simple Nativism is a double-barreled doctrine about the 
prestructured nature of both the form (or grammar) and the content (or semantics) of natural 
languages. Both aspects of the doctrine are open to serious question, but for reasons of space I 
shall here confine myself to a critique of the content side. The idea, recall, is that the content 
of language, the conceptual categories underlying linguistic expressions, are universal by 
virtue of innate endowment. Languages merely code a pre-existing universal ‘language of  
thought’ (Fodor et al., 1975).7  As Pinker (1994:82) has succinctly put it:  
“Knowing a language then is knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of words and 
vice versa. People without a language would still have mentalese, and babies and many 
nonhuman animals presumably have simpler dialects”. 
Three domains are often cited to substantiate such semantic universals: the domains 
of  kinship, color and spatial categories.8 The spatial ones are the most interesting, because it 
seems clear  that spatial reasoning seems to lie behind many other kinds of thinking – we 
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seem to be highly visual spatial creatures, whose natural aptitudes in spatial reasoning lend 
themselves to adoption in other domains. But let me turn first to color and kinship. 
 
3.1 Color categories in language 
 
Until 1967 it was generally thought  that the way in which languages segment the 
color space was essentially arbitrary, or culturally relative. Then Berlin and Kay (1969) 
collecting data from twenty languages, showed that there were fundamental shared patterns 
under the diversity. In a revised version of the theory (by Kay and McDaniel, 1978), the 
following are the main universal claims: 
1.   All languages have Basic Color Terms, that is, a set of terms which jointly exhaust the 
color space. (Words like blonde restricted to hair, or scarlet which is kind of red, or 
avocado which is primarily a name of an object, are not Basic Color terms.) 
2. There are 6 primary foci, or landmark colors, black and white and the four Hering 
opponent colors (red vs., green, blue vs. yellow), which form the ‘best exemplars’ of  the 
six first color words.  
3. There is a cultural evolution of languages, such that at Stage 1 languages divide the color 
space into cold/dark and warm/light areas (with three of the perceptual foci each), then at 
Stage 2, the warm/light area (covering red, yellow, white) splits into  white vs. red/yellow 
categories,  and so on successively until each of these composite categories breaks down 
into its elementary primaries, the Hering opponent hues.  
 
Figure 2 shows the expected division of the color space for a Stage 2 language with 
three basic color terms, with a ‘warm’ vs. a ‘white’ vs. a ‘cold’ term dividing up the color 
space among them (it also shows the universal foci around which color terms are organized).9  
 
- Figure 2 about here – 
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The theory is a frequently-cited,  textbook example of  semantic universals, which 
seems indeed to fit the Simple Nativist account: our innate perceptual and categorial system 
projects ‘color’ as a semantic domain, and systematically constrains its subdivision. From 
this, the lesson has been taken that in time the rest of the lexicon will be found in a similar 
way to be projected from perceptual and cognitive universals.10  
But recent findings have opened up the entire issue again, challenging especially the 
first and third claims, that all languages have Basic Color Words in the favoured sense, with 
the composite semantics indicated. For example, in the language Yélî Dnye (spoken on 
Rossel Island in Papua New Guinea), the existence of  Basic Color Words as originally 
envisaged must be in doubt (Levinson, 2000). To describe colors, reduplicated descriptive 
terms are used (e.g. “cockatoo - cockatoo” to denote white). Three of these – those describing 
black, white and red – are fairly conventional metaphors (although not without competing 
alternatives), but the rest grade into fresh simile and metaphor. On the face of it, this may 
look like an incipient  Stage 2 three-term system, but the terms are not composite (e.g. the 
‘black’ term does not cover blue and green, or the ‘red’ term red and yellow) as predicted by 
generalization 3 above. Nor do the three terms exhaust the color space as predicted by 
generalization 1; indeed using all the resources at their command (including fresh metaphors), 
informants leave about half of the color space unnamed. There is also a great deal of  subject 
variation. Figure 3 shows a typical subject response: the “parrot” term covers pure reds only, 
the “cockatoo” term pure whites, the “nut” term pure black. These are the relatively three 
well-established terms, which the theory wrongly predicts should universally pattern as in 
Figure 2. This subject also uses similes for yellow (‘dried leaves’), green (‘fresh leaves’), and 
purple (‘fruit species’), but there is much individual variation here.  
By the original definitions, these Yélî Dnye terms thus fail to constitute BCTs (which 
should be simplex lexemes, not primarily referring to objects,  that together jointly exhaust 
the color space), and the expressions fail to form a fully conventionalized semantic field.  
 
- Figure 3 about here  - 
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 One of the original authors (see Kay and Maffi, 1999) of the theory has recently 
reviewed this and other counterexamples to the original theory, and  now adopts the position 
(originally advanced by Lyons, 1995; 1999),  that there are indeed languages which do not 
have a systematic semantic domain covering color. Instead, he suggests that there are two 
major routes to the development of a full color lexicon, one as originally hypothesized, and 
another that allows incipient color words to emerge before there is any systematic treatment 
of color as a lexical domain.11  
The consequence is that systematic color terms are not linguistic universals: there is 
no automatic projection of color as a domain into the lexicon of every language. As the 
Simple Nativist account begins to looks less attractive, so a coevolutionary account begins to 
look more plausible. On a coevolutionary account, color perception gives us ‘landmark 
colors’. These landmark colors will then act as attractors for any color terms that emerge: as 
Deacon (1997:119-20) remarks “the pattern of errors in use and transmission of color terms 
will be biased like a loaded die, so that over time the linguistic references will converge to 
match the neurophysiological foci of perceptual experience”.  It takes a process of 
transmission with modification – a process of linguistic evolution – to fix a perceptual bias in 
a cultural tradition. A second factor that favours a co-evolutionary approach is the fact, 
originally noted by Berlin and Kay (1969), that the number of  color words in a language is 
correlated with technological complexity in a society. Now, a language like Yélî Dnye, which 
has no systematic color domain, is found in a culture in which there is no technology of color 
at all – that is, no dyeing, weaving, painting tradition. If you do not have dye or paint – that is 
applicable color separated from objects that naturally have colors – you do not need color 
words – you may as well describe red fruit as ‘ripe fruit’, or green leaves as ‘young leaves’, 
and so forth.  
In sum, then, a coevolutionary perspective seems better able to predict the facts than 
a Simple Nativist perspective: we shift the burden of explanation for language patterns away 
 12
from intrinsic properties of mind alone and instead focus on the interaction between innate 
perceptual (or cognitive) propensities on the one hand and cultural traditions on the other.12  
 
3.2 Kinship terminologies: supra-individual systems of  bio-social classification 
 
Let me now turn to kinship, because it illustrates a simple but important point: 
languages are not the projection of individual minds. Kin term systems organize a diversity of 
individual perspectives – those of males and females, parents and children, etc. – into one 
integrated system, which in turn is adapted to the surrounding social system, where it serves 
to guide biological reproduction.  
Kin terminologies have been thought to be candidate semantic universals for the 
following reasons: all languages seem to have systematic set of words which codify socio-
biological ties, and in the great majority of cases at least these seem to be built on the same 
‘elementary kin types’, namely M (mother), F (father), B (brother), Z (sister), S (son)  and D 
(daughter), H (husband), W(wife). Now immediate qualifications are in order here. First, 
given adoption and other social practices, it is not biological ties that are classified by such 
systems, so much as relationships treated in the idiom of biological ties. Secondly, the 
‘elementary kin-types’ are the members of the nuclear family, and many societies don’t have 
nuclear families, downgrade paternity, have transitory marital relationships and so on, so the 
primary status of notions like ‘father’ may be in doubt.13 But my purpose is not to question 
the basic assumptions here, but to point out how kin-term systems require a coevolutionary 
perspective.  
Take the Dravidian kin-term system, variants of which are used by all the Dravidian 
societies of South India and beyond, and whose proto-Dravidian ancestor can be 
reconstructed dating back 5000 years or more (Trautman, 1981).14  The Dravidian 
terminology fits into the world of South Indian castes. The system is exhaustive: anyone in 
one’s caste is a presumptive kinsman, and one must marry inside one’s caste, and thus marry 
a kinsman.  
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 - Figure 4 about here - 
 
Like many other kinship systems, the Dravidian system makes distinctions between 
males and females, older and younger siblings, and 2 or more generations up and down from 
ego, as indicated in Figure 4 (from Levinson, 1977). But the essence of the Dravidian kinship 
terminology is a cultural distinction between ‘parallel’ and ‘cross’ kin, which assigns siblings 
of  generations above ego to different categories. Thus my MZ (mother’s sister) and FB 
(father’s brother) are, for me,  in the parallel category; but my MB and FZ are in the cross-
category.15 For the generations above ego, the rules for assigning kin to parallel vs. cross 
categories are essentially: (a) opposite sex-siblings are of opposite category, same sex siblings 
are of same category, (b) marriage joins persons of the same category, (c) sons are of the 
same category as their fathers, daughters are of opposite category, except that (d) children in 
ego’s generation are of the same category as their parents, and finally (c) ego’s parents are 
always parallel. The application of these rules is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
- Figure 5 about here – 
 
Now,  crucially the term for MB is also the term for FZH, and the very same term is 
typically used for  a  wife’s father. These equations indicate a presumption of  a man’s 
marriage to the daughter of his MB or his FZ; and most Dravidian societies have a rule of 
cross-cousin marriage, enjoining marriage with either FZD or MBD or both  (and as a matter 
of fact an average of about  20% of marriages are with first cousins of this type in  Dravidian 
societies – Trautman, 1981:216-28).  
Now a moment’s reflection will show that the rules for cross/parallel assignment just 
given for ascending generations would, if applied to ego’s generation and below, engender 
incest: marriage joins people of the same category, and since (for ego’s generation) children 
are the same category as their parents, a male might be enjoined by the rules to marry his 
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sister! Thus the rules for cross/parallel assignment  must change: in ego’s generation and 
below one must marry a person of opposite category, and brothers and sisters must be of the 
same category, thus ensuring outbreeding – as illustrated in Figure 6: 
 
- Figure 6 about here -  
 
The kin diagram also makes clear another fundamental point: the system organizes 
many different points of view into a coherent whole. For example, my sister and I share the 
same terminology for the generations above. But for the generations below, we have different 
points of view: my children are Parallel for me (or for my brother), but Cross for my sister.  
The point of this example is the following. Here is a set of terms which have a 
culture-specific dimension – the Cross/Parallel distinction – which is adapted to the societal 
conditions, including a cross-cousin marriage rule and an assumption that every caste-
member is a kinsman. It has a supra-individual logic of design, yet it organizes individual 
viewpoints into a coherent whole. No individual designed this the system; and because it 
organizes a totality of distinct individual perspectives, it cannot be a projection of any 
individual’s ‘innate ideas’. Rather, it is the product of cultural evolution, which has evolved 
over thousands of years to fit the society it is used in (and in fact many variants of the 
Dravidian system exist, each finely attuned to the social structure of different castes). But at 
the same time it organizes biological reproduction: it embodies a marriage rule on the one 
hand, and on the other, it militates against incestuous unions through its classification of 
nuclear family members as always in the unmarriageable category. So once again, we have a 
bio-social system, here one which is tuned to both local cultural conditions and general 
outbreeding conditions. How can we get design without a designer? Darwin showed us the 
only way: transmission with slow modification, but the kind of theory we need is a theory of 
the co-evolution of culture and biology.  
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3.3. Spatial categories in language and cognition 
 
Presumptions of universality 
There are good reasons to think that if there are such things as innate ideas, then 
spatial concepts should be prime candidates. Spatial thinking is an adaptive necessity for any 
higher  animal species, and is thus likely to constitute an ancient, modular or domain-specific 
process shared across many mammalian species. Indeed there is good evidence for 
phylogenetic continuity across the primates in the neural architecture for spatial cognition. So 
this is the very last area in which we would expect to find significant cultural variation. 
Indeed, many philosophers, linguists and psychologists have confidently spelt out universals 
of spatial language and cognition - for example, they have posited the following properties of  
naive human spatial coordinate systems: 
• naive human spatial cognition is primarily egocentric in character (Piaget and Inhelder 
1956, Clark 1973, Lyons 1977, Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976, etc.) 
• it is anthropomorphic: coordinates are established through the planes of our body 
(left/right; front/back; up/down) (Kant, 1768; Cassirer, 1923; Poincaré, 1946; Clark, 
1973; Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976, etc.) 
• it makes no use of  ‘absolute’ or  geocentrically fixed angles (Talmy, 1983; Miller and 
Johnson-Laird, 1976). 
The presumption has been that these properties are fixed biases in human cognition, 
and will thus project directly into universals of semantics. Indeed, it has been presumed that 
simply by looking at the spatial system in any language, one obtains a good picture of our 
universal language of  thought (cf. “Space and force pervade language .... these concepts and 
relations appear to be the vocabulary and syntax of mentalese, the language of thought” 
Pinker 1997:355).  
Recent work by myself and colleagues has shown that these confident predictions are 
false (Levinson, 1996, Pederson et al., 1998). Once one turns away from the familiar, written 
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languages the diversity of spatial systems in languages becomes rapidly manifest. There are 
many languages in the world where the primary system of spatial coordinates is not 
egocentric (or relative as I shall say) but is rather based on fixed, arbitrary external 
coordinates, a bit like our north/south/east/west system of cardinal directions (systems I will 
call absolute). A vignette of such an absolute system will help to make vivid how such a 
system works. 
Guugu Yimithirr 
Guugu Yimithirr (GY) is an Aboriginal language spoken at Hopevale, in Northern 
Queensland, by the descendants of a hunting-gathering group (see Haviland, 1979). Central to 
linguistic competence in this language is the ability to use the cardinal direction system and 
the underlying orientation it requires. There are four named cardinal directions, thought of as 
edges of the horizon, with the northern quadrant skewed about fifteen degrees from our north, 
as illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
- Figure 7 about here - 
 
The four root terms can be further inflected to yield about 50 terms indicating motion 
towards a direction vs. motion from it, location at it, or vectors in a direction with focussed 
start and end points, etc. (see Haviland, 1993, Levinson, 1997a). The language has no 
locutions glossing ‘to the left of’, ‘to the right of’, ‘in front of’, ‘behind’, etc., comparable in 
use to the English terms. Thus instead of saying “the boy is left of/behind the tree” or “Take 
the first turning to the left”,   one is always forced into locutions of the kind ‘The boy is to the 
north/east etc. of the tree’, or ‘take the first turning to the north’ etc. (Levinson, 1997a). The 
system is applied also in small-scale space, as in ‘pass me the northern cup’ or ‘there’s an ant 
on your eastern leg’, and even in virtual space, to describe, e.g., events on a television, or in a 
dream (in fact I am happy to be able to report that to enter heaven you must head north).  
It is customary to describe all motions with directional terms (‘John went west’ rather 
than just ‘John’s gone’), often supplemented with gesture. Gesture gives analog accuracy to 
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crude digital lexical specification of direction, and thus plays an important part in 
communication.  
Such a system obviously requires that all speakers of the language are correctly 
oriented at all times and (less obviously) know or can calculate the absolute bearings of any 
place from any other (because if they are to describe a journey  they will need to describe the 
direction). We have directly spot-tested subjects’ abilities to point to any location from novel 
locations deep in the bush. The results show extraordinary dead-reckoning skills, more 
accurate than those achieved by homing pigeons, making it clear that what some species do 
by slow-evolved dedicated hardware, humans can do by culturally-developed software 
(Levinson, 1997a; in prep). Figure 8 compares the performance between 15 pigeons released 
about 70 km from home base and their bearings on the horizon, and 11 Guugu Yimithirr 
speakers similarly displaced to an unfamiliar location in forest surroundings, estimating a 
location by pointing.16 
 
- Figure 8 about here - 
 
 The findings are interesting: they show that speakers of this language are running a 
constant background calculation of their location with respect to other locations, maintaining 
their location on an accurate, oriented mental map. This is the necessary overhead of using a 
system otherwise so elegant in its utility and simplicity.  By contrast, Dutch or English 
speakers under comparable conditions approximate to random, or at best weakly systematic,  
estimates of direction.  It is clear then that Guugu Yimithirr speakers are at least doing some 
additional  computation to say Dutch speakers, namely, running a mental compass and 
positioning system. 
But do they really think about small-scale spatial relationships fundamentally 
differently from you and me? We need a simple method of probing for their non-linguistic 
“coding” or internal representations, their ‘Language of Thought’ as it were. Here is a simple 
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method. We can get subjects to memorize a spatial array and then get them to select from a 
set of alternatives the one they saw previously, as illustrated in Figure 9.  
- Figure 9 about here - 
The subject facing one direction, say south, is trained to memorize the top card in 
Figure 9. Then he is rotated 180 degrees, so that he is facing the other way (north) and his 
task is to choose the same card that he saw before. If, like us,  he rotates his coordinate 
system with himself,  he will chose the bottom card to the right of the diagram (he has, say, 
thought about the red square as to his left). If he employs co-ordinates located in the 
environment, these coordinates will not rotate with him, and he will chose the card at the 
bottom left.  
What we find is that in any task based on this kind of rotation, the Guugu Yimithirr 
speaker will select the solution that relies on ‘absolute’ external coordinates and the Dutch 
speaker will select the solution based on egocentric ‘relative’ coordinates. In fact, we get a 
systematic picture over a range of experiments that explore non-linguistic memory of various 
kinds and  reasoning over spatial relations.  
We have gone on to elaborate these methods and with a number of collaborators have 
tested the replicability of these results in a good sample of languages and cultures. The 
finding is that wherever a subject speaks a language with a relative (left/right/front/back) 
system and no absolute system of co-ordinates, there is a corresponding use of  relative 
coordinates in non-linguistic tasks, and vice-versa, where a language only uses absolute co-
ordinates, non-linguistic coding is in absolute terms (Levinson, 1996; Pederson et al., 1998).  
We have also gone on to do detailed work on child language, to explore when children master 
these absolute coordinate systems. Contrary to the claims of Piaget that abstract ‘Euclidean’ 
concepts would be universally late acquired, such systems are mastered by children as young 
as four years old (Brown and Levinson, in press). This is important, because it shows that, 
just as in the case of the infant’s recalibration of acoustic space, the child is so cognitively 
equipped that it can adapt relatively rapidly - as its cognitive processes mature - to the locally 
predominant semantical concepts.  
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In summary, what these studies show is the following. First, languages can vary 
fundamentally even in the core of this domain, the coordinate systems underlying spatial 
description. Secondly, such linguistic differences imply cognitive differences. The reason is 
simple enough: since  you may want  to describe arbitrary spatial experiences in the future, 
you must remember them in terms which will support that later linguistic description.  If you 
remember a spatial array in terms of left and right, you cannot later describe it in terms of 
north and south, and vice-versa. Language and cognitive style have to be congruent. 
Clearly, these facts are not in line with the expectations of  Simple Nativism, 
whereby when we learn a language all we do is map inner Language of Thought concepts 
onto outer language words. But nor do they necessarily imply the opposite extreme, in which  
the inner codings are an ‘introjection’ of an arbitrarily variable cultural tradition. For the 
linguistic traditions seem to build on one of three kinds of coordinate system, egocentric, 
object-centered and environmentally fixed, which in turn can be seen to play a role in our 
neurophysiology of spatial orientation (Levinson, 1996). Such an interplay between the 
architecture of  our bodies and the elaborations of cultural traditions is parallel to the much 
simpler picture in the color domain (or acoustic space). There, too, we had innate color foci 
(or acoustic foci), given to us by our psychophysics, which bias the cultural transmission so 
that they form the focus of color terms (or language-specific acoustic categories). So here in 
the spatial domain we see the interplay of  native propensities and cultural factors, perhaps 
suggesting a general model. The suggestion would be that rather than thinking primarily in 
terms of ‘innate ideas’ – what Elman et al., 1996 call ‘representational nativism’ – we should 
think in terms of architectural biases in perception, and specific neurophysiological systems 
for, e.g., keeping us aware of our position in space.17 These pre-existing systems bias the 
transmission of language as a cultural tradition, giving us the regularities and near universals 
to be found in semantic and conceptual systems.18 There is no innate notion of  ‘north’, but 
there is a pre-existing system for orienting ourselves in a larger environment, on which a 
notion of ‘north’ can be built. Thus the burden of explanation for the regularities and 
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learnability of languages can be spread across the two tracks of self-replicating information, 




I have suggested that the currently favoured  strategy for naturalizing language,  
Simple Nativism, is misguided in emphasis. The strategy locates all the central 
generalizations in an invariant mental endowment fixed by natural selection far back in the 
history of the species. In short, “language is just a biological system” (Chomsky, quoted in 
Campbell, 1983:97).  What is wrong with such a view  is that it not only minimizes the 
essential facts of variation, but that it views the variation as ‘noise’.19 Instead, a strategy that 
views human nature as built to expect cultural patterning, as evolved hand in hand with 
culture, seems a better direction to look for a theory that will supercede the old 
Nature:Nurture dichotomy. Coevolutionary or dual-track inheritance models are much better 
adjusted to the essential nature of language, a sustained and complex interaction between 
biology and culture. In turn, language, which has on the whole played a minor role in these 
models, may prove to be crucial to their proper development.  
In sum I have argued that: 
• human nature, our mental constitution, is equipped for variation, in language as elsewhere 
(as illustrated by infants reactions to phonetic experience), 
• the variation is embodied in cultural and linguistic  traditions (cf. kinship, color, space), 
• traditions are supra-individual (cf. kinship), organizing a shared linguistic and cognitive 
coding essential to communication (cf. space), 
• traditions exploit neurophysiological  biases  and processes, neglecting some of them, 
while amplifying others and building elaborate conceptual structures on top of them.  
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I took as my first example of the nativist provision for culture the human infant’s 
system for ‘tuning in’  to the locally significant speech sounds. Let me take as my final 
example the amazing phenomenon of sign language. Children raised to deaf parents switch 
the modality of the entire language system from the auditory-vocal channel to the gestural-
visual one. (The modality independence of language is already evident from reading and 
writing of course, but that is presumably a secondary and parasitic phenomenon.) Sign-
languages are now known to share many structural properties with spoken languages and like 
spoken-languages are processed largely in the left-hemisphere despite the visuo-spatial nature 
of the system (which might bias it to right-hemisphere processing). Some researchers 
conclude that we must be built in  advance  for just one of two modalities (Hauser, 1997:245). 
But children born deaf and blind shift the system to touch, although we currently know very 
little about such language systems. In any case, sign languages again illustrate the need for a 
coevolutionary perspective: sign language traditions have emerged only in the context of 
recessive hereditary deafness, and transgenerational maintenance of sign languages in turn 
depends on this genetic trait's maintaining a community of signers (Aoki and Feldman, 1991).   
There will be skeptics who doubt the need or efficacy of any strategy for naturalizing 
language: would it make a difference to how the language sciences actually proceed? The 
answer is affirmative: co-evolutionary models redirect attention, for example, to the 
flexibilities and inflexibilities of learning mechanisms (issues finessed by the Simple 
Nativists, but essential as we saw to infants’ initial relationships to linguistic sounds).20 But 
the main reasons to situate language in the natural landscape are two. First, there is the 
perennial hope that we may supercede the ideological trivialities of  the current level of 
Nature:Nurture controversies. Secondly, and more importantly, one simply wishes to 
understand where language fits in with the rest of natural history. It is the big picture that 
suffers most under the current rule of Simple Nativism or  its radical alternative, extreme 
cultural relativism.  
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1 “Among scholastic theoreticians of language the renowned Paris savant of the twelfth century, Pierre 
Hélie, declared that there are as many kinds of grammar as their are languages; whereas in the 
thirteenth century, grammatica universalis was considered indispensable to give grammar a scientific 
status. Roger Bacon taught: ‘Grammatica una et eadem est secundum substantiam in omnibus linguis, 
licet accidentaliter varietur’” (Jakobson, 1961:264).  
2 The history of the opposition in our own cultural tradition is explored in e.g. Collingwood, 1945, and 
the papers by Mittelstrass and Bredekamp, this volume. The corresponding contrasts in other cultural 
traditions can be strikingly different; see, e.g., Descola and Pálsson, 1996; Ellen and Fukui, 1996. 
3 Chomsky (1982:321) suggests that Universal Grammar may in some way be a side effect of laws of 
growth or form applied to the massive human cortex. Elsewhere he admits to general skepticism about 
the theory of natural selection:  “In my view (in this respect I may be a little more heretical), natural 
selection in itself does not provide anywhere near enough structure to account for what happens in 
evolution”  (cited in Campbell, 1983:97).  
4 There is much talk in linguistics of ‘language universals’, so that outsiders to the field may well be 
forgiven for thinking that there is a large body of properties that all languages are known to share. This 
is not the case. On the one hand, Chomsky and followers have posited highly abstract properties, 
constantly varied under changes of theory, which are difficult to test and hence never demonstrated for 
more than a handful of languages. On the other hand, Greenberg (1961) and followers have searched 
for more superficial, empirical generalizations over a few hundred languages; these generalizations 
turn out almost invariably to be statistical tendencies in conditional form (e.g., if a language has verb-
last word order, the chances are high it has relative clauses in front of the nouns they modify). It may 
come as a surprise to the general reader to know that we have good information on only perhaps 7% of 
the 7-8000 odd languages of the world (the higher estimate is probably correct, but even that we do not 
know).   
5 There are many problems with the idea that the culture track is similar to the genetic track – it clearly 
lacks Mendelian segregates and recombination, and it supplements vertical transmission with 
horizontal transmission more like viral infections than genealogical descent (see Sperber, 1996). One 
eminent biologist has even stated that the idea of a parallel between biological and cultural evolution 
has done much more harm than good (Gould, 1991:63, cited in Dennett, 1995:342). But as Dennett 
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(1995:345) remarks, the truth about whether cultural replicators are really like biological ones will turn 
out to lie somewhere in the fertile ground between the possible extremes. The study of  language, a 
human ability midway between biology and culture, is the best possible place to try and get a little 
further.  
6 Simple nativism holds that “the rich computational architecture of the human mind” is “where 
sufficiently powerful ordering processes – ones capable of explaining the phenomena -  are primarily to 
be found”; and the approach criticizes the coevolutionary perspective as sharing, along with the ‘social 
science model’, a vague or even mystical ontology: “attempting to locate in these population-level 
processes the primary generator of significant organization has caused these processes to be 
fundamentally misunderstood” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992:47). Biologists on the whole will find this 
unconvincing: the function of culture is its ability for swift change: “it should follow that the fittest 
genotypes are those that least restrain tradigenetic [cultural] rule flexibility” (Markl, 1982:19).  
7 Within linguistics there has been considerable debate about two versions of this doctrine. Fodor’s 
version is that every word meaning corresponds to an antecedently existing native concept, no matter 
whether we are considering the meaning of tree or logarithm. Others imagine that there is a role for 
constructivism: complex cultural concepts can be built out of  simpler native concepts – see Levinson, 
1997b for discussion.  
8 See, e.g., Leech, 1981:Ch 12, Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976.  
9 Color in human psychophysics varies on three dimensions (usually denoted hue, saturation and 
brightness). The figure shows an approximation to  the Munsell color chart (exact reproduction of 
colors is not possible in such a print), which is a Mercator-style projection, as it were, of the three-
dimensional color solid. There are many intriguing discrepancies between the physics and the 
psychophysics, most notable here the ‘color circle’, whereby the shortest perceptible wavelengths are 
closest to the longest. On why human color vision is psychophysically tridimensional, see Shepard, 
1992, who claims that it is an adaptation to the need for color constancy under the varying 
illuminations on our planet.  
10 Despite warnings from Berlin, Kay and Merrifield, 1991:24 against “sweeping conclusions”. It is 
clear  that color may be unusual, in that it is not often that the peripheral nervous system may be 
involved in the structuring of semantic fields. 
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11 Kay & Maffi consider that the three Yélî Dnye expressions used to describe black, white and red are 
Basic Color Words, notwithstanding their complex form and derivation from object names. But they 
acknowledge that the expressions fail to have the expected composite semantics,  and fail to partition 
the color space.  
 
12 Co-evolutionary theorists have in fact seized on the example from the beginning. Lumsden and 
Wilson (1981:43ff) point out that (in a way similar to my example from auditory space) four-month old 
infants already show a (presumably innate) color categorization for the Hering opponent hues. See also 
Durham, 1991:213-23, who recounts the experiment by Rosch (1973), who showed that peoples whose 
language has few color terms can more easily be taught terms conforming to the landmark colors. But 
it is Deacon (1997) who most explicitly makes the point being made here, which is strongly reinforced 
by the newly established fact that color is not strictly a universal semantic domain. 
13 In matrilineal systems of kinship,  the official ideology may even deny the role of the male in 
reproduction (Fathauer, 1962). For a classic case of  such a system where there is no nuclear family 
and no exclusive sexual rights in marriage see Gough, 1962.  
14 This system exists in myriad variants: many of the countless sub-castes of South India have 
distinctive variants of their own; see e.g. Beck, 1972. 
15 I shall use the following customary abbreviations for the nuclear family kin-types: M (mother), F 
(father), B (brother), Z (sister), H (husband), W (wife), Son (son), D (daughter), so that e.g. MBD is 
read as ‘mother’s brother’s daughter’.  
16 However, the Guugu Yimithirr estimates are to a location other than home-base and one in fact 
rarely visited, a considerably harder task.  
17 The doctrine of “innate ideas” has of course a distinguished history from Plato through Descartes, 
Leibniz and Kant to modern thinkers like Chomsky  (Stich, 1975). But from the point of view of  
current neuroscience, it is hard to see how innate representations (as opposed to architectural biases of 
various kinds) could actually be instantiated  (see Elman et al., 1996:Ch. 5). Singer (this volume) 
points out how architectural biases create expectancies in the visual system, which then interact with 
experience to give the Gestalt constancies of interpretation.  
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18 Similarly, coevolutionary perspectives suggest that the kind of  strong (but not absolute) tendencies 
found in language typology of the Greenbergian school (see, e.g., Greenberg, 1961; Croft,1993) might 
be related to cognitive biases of various kinds. See Hawkins (1994) for suggestions.  
19 As mentioned in an earlier footnote, the degree of variation in the existing 8000 or so languages is 
currently unknown, since well under 10% have been properly studied. Of these 8000 languages, about 
half are spoken by less than 10,000 speakers, and of these, half again by groups of less than 1000 
(Harmon, 1995). Thus much of the variation lies in ancient traditions maintained by very small human 
groups. Just as we are losing much of the biodiversity of the world in a massive extinction event 
similar to the loss of the dinosaurs (see papers by  Raven and Markl, this volume), so we are losing 
most of the human diversity (some estimates suggest loss of 90% of the languages of the world by the 
end of next century). The two great extinctions, biological and cultural, are linked of course, since they 
are due to the loss of the ecological niches that support small, specialized populations. Just like 
biological adaptations, these languages and cultures are ancient adaptations, the loss of which not only 
reduces human experience and knowledge (including knowledge about the natural world), but also our 
awareness of  the many different, viable ways of arranging human affairs. Such loss will enormously 
impoverish the scientific study of  human language and culture, which still lacks its Darwin, has 
already lost its Galapagos, and will soon lose its continents of variation, as it were.  
20 See, e.g., Tomasello et al., 1993, Elman et al., 1996.   
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